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TAX COMMENT
portioned" and by Section 9 of the same article which provides that
"no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion
to the census," the tax complained of therefore being unapportioned,
is unconstitutional, if direct.
A tax levied upon the exercise of only one of the powers incidental to ownership of property is an excise and as such falls into
the class of indirect taxes which need not be apportioned
and does not
3
violate any of the provisions of the Constitution.
The tax in the instant case was levied against a particular use
made by the plaintiff of his property, that of giving it away. This
tax is indistinguishable from the unapportioned tax levied upon the
use of carriages, which tax was declared valid in Hylton v. United
States, 4 or the tax on the privilege to use foreign-built yachts upheld
in Billings v. United States.5 Taxes of this nature levied upon the
exercise of a particular power incidental to ownership of property
never having been understood to be direct, the Court -is
very reluctant
to curtail or limit by construction the sovereign power of taxation.
The presumption in favor of the constitutionality of any act of
Congress is overcome when the question is free from any reasonable
doubt, and only in the event that there is no reasonable doubt will the
Court hold an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. 6 The power to
tax being the most important power of Government it is doubly
essential to regard this presumption of validity in regard to Revenue
Acts of Congress.
E.S.
GROSS RECEIPTS TAX-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-The plaintiff, a New Jersey corporation, having a part
of its lines in and over New Jersey roads, transmits messages over
them to places both within and without the state. The state levied a
property and franchise tax of 5% on such part of the gross receipts
received from all the work transacted within the state, as the lines
in the public places bear to the total lines in the state. The lines in
public places are about half of the total lines, fully a quarter of the
total receipts in the intrastate business results from an extensive
interstate commerce. The plaintiff contends that the tax is invalid
inasmuch as it is a direct tax on the gross receipts derived from interstate commerce. Held, that the tax sought to be imposed is in violation of the commerce clause since it is a direct tax on the gross
receipts derived from interstate commerce rather than a franchise
tax on property, using gross receipts as a measure of value of property rights in accordance with Constitution N. J., Art. 4, Sec. 7,
Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796) ; Billings v. U. S., supra Note 1.
'Hylton v. U. S., supra Note 3.
Billings v. U. S., supra Note 1.
CNicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 514, 515, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522 (1898).
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Although a state may tax property used entirely in ifiterstate
commerce, it may not burden such commerce by taxing gross earnings
derived therefrom by imposing a license fee for the privilege of
carrying on such commerce.1 A direct tax on gross receipts derived
from interstate commerce is not a tax on property, and is therefore
void.2 If the gross earnings are not taxed, but are used merely to
ascertain value the tax is legitimate.3 The dissenting opinion in the
case is founded upon the theory that the fixing of a price for the
privilege of using something to which the state's consent is essential
is within the constitutional power of the state.4 Even interstate
commerce must pay its way. 5 It is submitted that the Supreme
Court should have given greater weight to the right of the state to
tax the privilege which it had granted.
W. S.

INCOME-DEDUCTIONS -

OBSOLESCENCE-

GOOD

WILI.-The

plaintiff brought this action to recover taxes alleged to have been
illegally exacted from it. The defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, refused to allow plaintiff's claim for a deduction from its income,
for the obsolescence of its good will due to the imminence of Prohibition Legislation. The plaintiff contended that its good will was such
property as was meant by Section 234 (a), Subdivision 7 of Revenue
Act of 1912 (Act of Feb. 24, 1919) C 18; 40 Stat. 1057, 1078,
allowing as deductions, inter alia, a reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business,
including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence. The collector
disallowed the claim on the ground that the obsolescence intended by
Section 234 (a), Subdivision 7 of Revenue Act of 1918 could only
apply to obsolescence of property used in the trade or business as was
subject to exhaustion, wear and tear, and therefore could not include
good will or obsolescence of the good will. Held, that a deduction
for obsolescence of good will of a brewery due to the imminence of
national prohibition legislation is not allowable under Section 234 (a),
1 Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 338, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366, 368
(1922), and cases cited therein; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 171, 48

Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 62 A. L. R. 45 1928).
'U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 32
(1912),; Pullman v. Richardson, supra Note 1; U. S. Glue
247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 748
' Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450, 38

Sup. Ct. Rep. 211
Co. v. Oak Creek,
(1918).
Sup. Ct. Rep. 373

(1917).
'Per Holmes, J.

'Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep.
265 (1918).

